wehub-resource-sync
e071084ebe
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31 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
31 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
<!--
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The SECURITY prompt — go-micro's security audit. Editable policy; the workflow
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prepends the agent @mention and substitutes __ISSUE__ before posting. Keep
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__ISSUE__ literal.
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Deliberately conservative: it does NOT auto-merge fixes, and it does NOT publish
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exploit details in public issues (responsible disclosure).
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-->
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Act as the security reviewer for go-micro. Audit for real, exploitable vulnerabilities — skip theoretical or lint-style noise.
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GO-MICRO ATTACK SURFACE — weight these:
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- **MCP gateway** (`gateway/mcp`) and **A2A gateway** (`gateway/a2a`) — untrusted input from agents/tools: auth/scope enforcement, injection into downstream RPC, SSRF via tool/agent URLs, rate-limit/circuit-breaker bypass, info leak in errors.
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- **x402 payments** (`wrapper/x402`) — payment verification and settlement: signature/mandate validation, replay, budget-reservation races, facilitator auth (CDP bearer) handling, amount/network confusion.
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- **Auth** (`auth/jwt`, `wrapper/auth`) — token validation, algorithm confusion, scope/priority rule bypass, missing checks on endpoints.
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- **AI providers** (`ai/*`) — base-URL and endpoint handling: SSRF via config-controlled `BaseURL`, API keys leaking into logs/errors, TLS verification.
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- **Agent tool loop** (`agent/`) — prompt injection reaching real tool calls, guardrail (`MaxSteps`/`LoopLimit`/`ApproveTool`) bypass, delegate/plan side effects.
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- **Trust boundaries** — `server` RPC handlers, `broker` consumers, `store`/`registry` inputs, `transport` TLS defaults (v6 verifies by default — confirm nothing regressed).
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- **The loop itself** — `.github/workflows/loop-*.yml`: the `CODEX_TRIGGER_TOKEN` PAT must never be echoed/leaked; workflow inputs must not enable script injection.
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- **Dependencies** — run `govulncheck ./...` (install if needed) and inspect `go.mod` for known CVEs.
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DEDUPE against open issues first.
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HOW TO REPORT:
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- **Known/public dependency CVEs**: file a `security` issue referencing the CVE + module; you MAY open a PR bumping to the patched version. Do NOT enable auto-merge.
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- **Novel, exploitable vulnerabilities in this code** (not yet public): do NOT post an exploit or PoC in a public issue. File a CONCISE `security` + `needs-human` issue naming the class, location (file/function), and impact only — and note it should go through GitHub private vulnerability reporting. Do NOT open a public fix PR that reveals it.
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- **Low-risk hardening**: a normal `security` issue is fine.
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NEVER auto-merge a security change. Never weaken a control to make a test pass. Architectural/breaking fixes → `needs-human` with the tradeoff.
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Post a summary as a comment on this issue (#__ISSUE__) — findings by severity, what you filed, what needs a human — then close it (`gh issue close __ISSUE__`). If you open a dependency-bump PR: `git switch -c loop/security-__ISSUE__`, `git push -u origin loop/security-__ISSUE__`, `gh pr create --base master --label codex --label security --title "<title>" --body "<summary, Closes #__ISSUE__>"` — then STOP, do NOT run `gh pr merge --auto`. Do not use the make_pr tool.
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