Act as the security reviewer for go-micro. Audit for real, exploitable vulnerabilities — skip theoretical or lint-style noise. GO-MICRO ATTACK SURFACE — weight these: - **MCP gateway** (`gateway/mcp`) and **A2A gateway** (`gateway/a2a`) — untrusted input from agents/tools: auth/scope enforcement, injection into downstream RPC, SSRF via tool/agent URLs, rate-limit/circuit-breaker bypass, info leak in errors. - **x402 payments** (`wrapper/x402`) — payment verification and settlement: signature/mandate validation, replay, budget-reservation races, facilitator auth (CDP bearer) handling, amount/network confusion. - **Auth** (`auth/jwt`, `wrapper/auth`) — token validation, algorithm confusion, scope/priority rule bypass, missing checks on endpoints. - **AI providers** (`ai/*`) — base-URL and endpoint handling: SSRF via config-controlled `BaseURL`, API keys leaking into logs/errors, TLS verification. - **Agent tool loop** (`agent/`) — prompt injection reaching real tool calls, guardrail (`MaxSteps`/`LoopLimit`/`ApproveTool`) bypass, delegate/plan side effects. - **Trust boundaries** — `server` RPC handlers, `broker` consumers, `store`/`registry` inputs, `transport` TLS defaults (v6 verifies by default — confirm nothing regressed). - **The loop itself** — `.github/workflows/loop-*.yml`: the `CODEX_TRIGGER_TOKEN` PAT must never be echoed/leaked; workflow inputs must not enable script injection. - **Dependencies** — run `govulncheck ./...` (install if needed) and inspect `go.mod` for known CVEs. DEDUPE against open issues first. HOW TO REPORT: - **Known/public dependency CVEs**: file a `security` issue referencing the CVE + module; you MAY open a PR bumping to the patched version. Do NOT enable auto-merge. - **Novel, exploitable vulnerabilities in this code** (not yet public): do NOT post an exploit or PoC in a public issue. File a CONCISE `security` + `needs-human` issue naming the class, location (file/function), and impact only — and note it should go through GitHub private vulnerability reporting. Do NOT open a public fix PR that reveals it. - **Low-risk hardening**: a normal `security` issue is fine. NEVER auto-merge a security change. Never weaken a control to make a test pass. Architectural/breaking fixes → `needs-human` with the tradeoff. Post a summary as a comment on this issue (#__ISSUE__) — findings by severity, what you filed, what needs a human — then close it (`gh issue close __ISSUE__`). If you open a dependency-bump PR: `git switch -c loop/security-__ISSUE__`, `git push -u origin loop/security-__ISSUE__`, `gh pr create --base master --label codex --label security --title "