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59 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
59 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# BFLD Research Bundle — Beamforming Feedback Layer for Detection
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BFLD is the safety layer that detects when RF data becomes identifying. It sits between
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raw 802.11 beamforming feedback (BFI) and every downstream consumer — home automation,
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MQTT, Matter, cloud — measuring the identity-leakage potential of each frame and gating
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what leaves the node. It does not produce identity; it guards against accidental or
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adversarial exposure of identity.
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---
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## Table of Contents
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| File | Purpose |
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|------|---------|
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| [01-sota-survey.md](01-sota-survey.md) | State-of-the-art literature: BFI vs CSI, attack tooling, identity-inference research, privacy-preserving techniques |
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| [02-soul.md](02-soul.md) | Architectural intent, ethical stance, three non-negotiable invariants |
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| [03-security-threat-model.md](03-security-threat-model.md) | Adversary classes, attack trees, mitigations, trust-boundary diagram, per-privacy-class analysis |
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| [04-privacy-gating.md](04-privacy-gating.md) | privacy_class byte semantics, hash rotation algorithm, embedding lifecycle, wire-format diffs |
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| [05-automation-integration.md](05-automation-integration.md) | Home Assistant entities, Matter clusters, MQTT ACLs, cognitum federation |
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| [06-implementation-plan.md](06-implementation-plan.md) | New crate layout, reuse map, ESP32 additions, test plan, phased rollout |
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| [07-benchmarks-and-evaluation.md](07-benchmarks-and-evaluation.md) | Datasets, metrics, red-team protocol, comparison baselines |
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| [08-adr-draft.md](08-adr-draft.md) | Draft ADR-118 for formal project adoption |
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| [09-github-issue.md](09-github-issue.md) | GitHub issue draft for tracking implementation |
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| [10-gist.md](10-gist.md) | Public-facing one-pager / blog summary |
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---
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## Executive Summary
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1. **Problem.** IEEE 802.11ac/ax beamforming feedback (BFI) — the compressed angle matrices
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(Phi/Psi, Givens rotation) exchanged between client and AP — is transmitted unencrypted
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on the management plane. Academic work (BFId at ACM CCS 2025, LeakyBeam at NDSS 2025)
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demonstrates that a passive sniffer with commodity hardware can re-identify individuals
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and infer occupancy through walls using only these frames. Existing CSI-based sensing
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pipelines have no explicit layer to detect when their output crosses from "motion event"
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into "identity record."
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2. **Approach.** BFLD is a new crate (`wifi-densepose-bfld`) that wraps the BFI extraction
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and normalization path in an identity-leakage estimator. Every output frame carries a
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computed `identity_risk_score` and a `privacy_class` byte; downstream consumers decide
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whether to act based on those tags rather than on raw measurements.
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3. **Novel contribution.** BFLD does not try to suppress identity inference — it tries to
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*measure* it continuously and make the measurement explicit in every event. This
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transforms a latent, silent risk into an observable, auditable signal. The combination
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of per-day per-site hash rotation and a local-only identity embedding creates structural
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impossibility of cross-site re-identification — not merely a policy promise.
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4. **Security posture.** Raw BFI never leaves the node. Identity embeddings live only in
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an in-RAM ring buffer. The rf_signature_hash rotates daily using a per-site blake3
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keyed-hash that is never transmitted. Matter and HA expose only presence, motion, and
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person_count — never risk scores or embeddings.
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5. **Integration plan.** Six phases: P1 frame format + extractor stub, P2 feature
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extraction + identity_risk, P3 privacy gate + MQTT, P4 HA integration, P5 Matter
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exposure, P6 cognitum federation. Each phase maps to a numbered acceptance criterion.
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The crate slots into the existing workspace between `wifi-densepose-signal` and
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`wifi-densepose-sensing-server`.
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