wehub-resource-sync
57 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
# Sample Receipt Fixtures
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Three pre-generated receipt files for inspection without running the notebook.
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| File | What it is |
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|---|---|
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| `01_valid_receipt.json` | A valid signed receipt for a `lookup_flights` tool call. Verification returns True. |
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| `02_tampered_receipt.json` | The same receipt with one field modified after signing. Verification returns False. |
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| `03_chain_three_receipts.json` | A chain of three valid receipts (search, hold, book) with `previous_receipt_hash` linking each to the prior one. |
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## Verifying the samples
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The notebook walks through verification in four sections. To verify these fixtures
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directly without running through the notebook narrative:
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```python
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import json
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from pathlib import Path
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# Assumes you have completed the imports and helper functions
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# from sections 1 and 2 of 18-signed-receipts.ipynb.
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valid = json.loads(Path("01_valid_receipt.json").read_text())
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print(f"Valid receipt: {verify_receipt(valid)}") # True
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tampered = json.loads(Path("02_tampered_receipt.json").read_text())
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print(f"Tampered receipt: {verify_receipt(tampered)}") # False
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chain = json.loads(Path("03_chain_three_receipts.json").read_text())
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for r in verify_chain(chain):
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print(f" Receipt {r['index']} ({r['tool']}): {'VALID' if r['overall_valid'] else 'INVALID'}")
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```
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## How these were generated
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The fixtures use the same code path as the notebook, with one fixed signing key
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and fixed timestamps for byte-reproducibility. To regenerate:
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```bash
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python3 generate_fixtures.py
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```
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(Script is at `generate_fixtures.py` in this directory.)
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## What students learn from inspecting raw JSON
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Reading the raw receipt format builds intuition that the cells in the notebook
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do not always provide. Students who skim the JSON often notice:
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1. The signature is an opaque base64url string, but every other field is plain
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readable JSON. The signature does not encrypt the content; it attests to it.
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2. The `public_key` is embedded in the receipt. An auditor needs nothing else
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to verify (subject to trusting that the key actually belongs to the claimed
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issuer; see the lesson README on identity infrastructure).
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3. Modifying a single character of any field, then re-comparing this file with
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`02_tampered_receipt.json`, makes the byte-level mechanism concrete.
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