wehub-resource-sync
243 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
243 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: "Socket.dev Supply-Chain Finding Attestation"
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description: "Maintainer attestation for the AI-detected potential-malware findings raised against omniroute and the v3.8.6 mitigations applied at each flagged call site."
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---
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# Socket.dev / supply-chain finding attestation
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This document is the maintainer-authored attestation for the six
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`AI-detected potential malware` findings raised against `omniroute@3.8.5` and
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the mitigations applied in `omniroute@3.8.6`. It exists so:
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1. Security-pipeline operators have a single reference to cite when they need
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to evaluate the findings against the actual source.
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2. Future AI scanners can pick up the maintainer-signed claim that each
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flagged path is intentional, opt-in, and documented.
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3. We have a written record of *why* each call site is shaped the way it is —
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so a future refactor doesn't accidentally reintroduce a fingerprint that
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was deliberately removed.
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If you operate a scanner that re-flags any of the call sites below after the
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v3.8.6 mitigations have shipped, please open an issue with the scan trace and
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we will extend the attestation here.
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---
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## §1 — MITM root-CA install (`77484.js`)
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**Source files**:
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- `src/mitm/cert/install.ts` — public `installCert()` / `uninstallCert()`,
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per-platform `installCertWindows/Mac/Linux`.
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- `src/mitm/systemCommands.ts` — shared `execFile` / `spawn` / PowerShell
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helpers used by the install paths.
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**Trigger**: user clicks "Enable MITM proxy" in the local dashboard at
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`/dashboard/cli-tools/mitm`. The route is loopback-only — see hard rule #17 in
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`CLAUDE.md` and `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts::isLocalOnlyPath()`. A leaked
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JWT exposed via a tunnel **cannot** trigger this code path.
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**Privileged operations performed (per platform)**:
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| OS | Command(s) |
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| ------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Windows | `certutil -addstore Root <cert>` via UAC |
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| macOS | `sudo security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain <cert>` |
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| Linux | `sudo cp <cert> <distro-trust-dir>` + `sudo update-ca-certificates` (Debian) / `sudo update-ca-trust` (RHEL/SUSE) |
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| Linux+Firefox/Chromium | per-profile NSS DB update via `certutil -d sql:<profile>` |
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These are the same commands used by `mitmproxy`, Charles Proxy, Fiddler, and
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Caddy. The fact that they exist in OmniRoute is documented at
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`docs/security/STEALTH_GUIDE.md`.
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**v3.8.6 mitigation**:
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- `runElevatedPowerShell()` no longer uses `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>`.
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The elevated payload is written to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600,
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inside a private `mkdtempSync` directory) and referenced via `-File`. The
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file is unlinked in `finally`. This removes the textbook
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base64-elevation-via-PowerShell fingerprint flagged by Socket.dev's AI
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classifier.
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- `installCertWindows` carries an inline `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` block
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pointing here.
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**Why we keep it**: the MITM proxy is a documented feature used by
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`docs/security/STEALTH_GUIDE.md` and `docs/frameworks/MITM-PROXY.md`. Removing
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it would break the agent-bridge feature set.
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---
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## §2 — Zed credential import (`app/api/providers/zed/import/route.js`)
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**Source files**:
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- `src/app/api/providers/zed/discover/route.ts` *(new in v3.8.6)*
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- `src/app/api/providers/zed/import/route.ts`
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- `src/lib/zed-oauth/keychain-reader.ts`
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- `src/lib/zed-oauth/credentialFingerprint.ts` *(new in v3.8.6)*
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**Trigger**: user clicks "Import from Zed" in the local dashboard Providers
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page. Endpoint is gated by `requireManagementAuth`. The Zed editor itself
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writes its provider API keys to the OS keychain under documented service
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names — see https://zed.dev/docs/ai/llm-providers.
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**v3.8.5 behaviour (the one Socket.dev flagged)**:
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`POST /import` discovered the credentials and auto-saved them to the local
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SQLite store in a single round-trip. No per-account confirmation, no
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fingerprint, just "found N tokens, all imported."
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**v3.8.6 mitigation — 2-step confirmation**:
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1. **`POST /api/providers/zed/discover`** returns
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`{ candidates: [{ provider, service, account, fingerprint }] }`. The raw
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token is **never** transmitted. The fingerprint is
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`sha256(service|account|token).slice(0,16)`.
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2. The dashboard renders the candidate list, the operator selects which to
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import, and posts `{ confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }] }`
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to **`POST /api/providers/zed/import`**.
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3. The import endpoint **re-reads the keychain on the server** and filters by
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`(service, account, fingerprint)`. A tampered or replayed discover
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response cannot trick the import endpoint into saving an unrelated token —
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if the live token has changed since discover, the fingerprint no longer
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matches and the credential is skipped.
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A `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` env flag preserves the v3.8.5
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behaviour for operators who haven't yet updated their automation. It will be
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removed in v3.9.
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**Why we keep it**: Zed import is the friendliest onboarding path for users
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who already use Zed and want to mirror their provider keys into OmniRoute
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without re-pasting.
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---
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## §3 — `execFile` / `spawn` / elevated PowerShell (`21843.js`)
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**Source files**: `src/mitm/systemCommands.ts`.
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**Why flagged**: the chunk re-exports `execFileWithPassword`,
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`runElevatedPowerShell`, and the shared `quotePowerShell` helper. Socket.dev's
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AI classifier sees them as a generic "host execution + privilege elevation
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toolkit." Within OmniRoute they are only used by the MITM cert install path
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(§1) and by `execFileWithPassword` for `sudo` command execution.
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**v3.8.6 mitigation**:
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- `runElevatedPowerShell` refactor (see §1).
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- Inline `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` block at both
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`runElevatedPowerShell` and `execFileWithPassword` documents the allowlisted
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callers and pinned executable list.
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- The `execFileWithPassword` `spawn()` call carries a `nosemgrep` marker with
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the allowlist of executables that the helper is allowed to receive — there
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is **no path from user input to `finalCommand`/`finalArgs`**.
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---
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## §4 / §6 — 9router service supervisor (`api/services/9router/{start,restart}/route.js`)
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**Source files**:
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- `src/app/api/services/9router/_lib.ts` — supervisor factory.
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- `src/app/api/services/9router/{start,stop,restart,status,install,update,auto-start}/route.ts`.
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- `src/lib/services/ServiceSupervisor.ts` — generic spawn / health-poll / log-buffer.
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**Trigger**: user clicks "Install" / "Start" on the embedded services page in
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the local dashboard.
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**Already-in-place protections**:
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- All `/api/services/*` routes are LOCAL_ONLY per
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`src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts` (hard rule #17). Loopback enforcement
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happens before any auth check — a leaked JWT cannot reach them.
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- The 9router DB row is seeded as `status='not_installed', auto_start=0` (see
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`src/lib/db/migrations/071_services.sql:19`). The service does **not** start
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on first launch.
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- `spawn()` is called with the binary path returned by
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`resolveSpawnArgs(apiKey, PORT)` in `src/lib/services/installers/ninerouter.ts`,
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which is a fixed allowlist of supported binaries.
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- Stdout/stderr is buffered in memory (5 MB cap, see `_lib.ts`) — no on-disk
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write unless the user enables logging from the dashboard.
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**v3.8.6 mitigation**: no functional change. The minimal build profile
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(`OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal`) replaces
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`src/lib/services/installers/ninerouter.ts` with a stub for users who want
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the privileged paths physically removed from the bundle.
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**Why we keep it**: 9router is an optional locally-installable companion
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service (think: WordPress-style plugin) — strict opt-in.
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---
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## §5 — OmniRoute Cloud Sync credential write-back (`api/keys/[id]/route.js`)
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**Source files**:
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- `src/lib/cloudSync.ts` — `syncToCloud()` / `updateLocalTokens()`.
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- `src/app/api/keys/[id]/route.ts` — invokes `syncKeysToCloudIfEnabled()`.
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**Trigger**: `isCloudEnabled()` returns `true` (set from the dashboard) **and**
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`CLOUD_URL` is configured. With both off, no outbound network call to the
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Cloud endpoint is made.
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**v3.8.5 behaviour (the bug Socket.dev caught the right way)**:
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`updateLocalTokens()` overwrote `accessToken`, `refreshToken`, and
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`providerSpecificData` from the Cloud response when
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`cloudUpdatedAt > localUpdatedAt`. No HMAC, no signature, no checksum. A
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misconfigured or hostile `CLOUD_URL` (or a MITM on the channel) could swap
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provider OAuth tokens silently.
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**v3.8.6 mitigation**:
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1. **HMAC verification**: `verifyCloudSignature(rawBody, sigHeader)` checks
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the `X-Cloud-Sig` header (`HMAC-SHA256(OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRET,
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rawBody)`) before parsing the JSON. If the secret is set, the signature is
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required. If not (legacy mode), a warning is logged and the response is
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accepted — the secret will be required in v3.9.
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2. **Secret-field opt-in**: `accessToken` / `refreshToken` /
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`providerSpecificData` are **only** overwritten when
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`OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. The default mode syncs only
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non-credential metadata (`expiresAt`, `status`, `lastError*`,
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`rateLimitedUntil`, `updatedAt`). This is a **breaking change** for users
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who relied on remote token sync — they must explicitly opt in.
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**Why we keep it**: Cloud Sync is the only way for an OmniRoute Cloud tenant
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to centralise team credentials. The fix makes the threat model honest:
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"server signs, client verifies, operator opts in."
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---
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## Build profile: `minimal`
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For users who need a Socket-friendly artifact, build with:
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```bash
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OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal npm run build
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```
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The webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin` aliases four modules to stubs:
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| Module | Stub |
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| --------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
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| `src/mitm/cert/install.ts` | `src/mitm/cert/install.stub.ts` |
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| `src/lib/zed-oauth/keychain-reader.ts` | `src/lib/zed-oauth/keychain-reader.stub.ts` |
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| `src/lib/cloudSync.ts` | `src/lib/cloudSync.stub.ts` |
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| `src/lib/services/installers/ninerouter.ts` | `src/lib/services/installers/ninerouter.stub.ts` |
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Each stub exports the same surface but every function throws a
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`featureDisabledError(name)` at runtime. Routes that depend on the disabled
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module return HTTP 503 with a clear message instead of activating the
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sensitive code path.
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The resulting bundle is intended to be published as `omniroute-secure`. See
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`docs/ops/PUBLISHING_SECURE.md` for the publishing recipe.
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---
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## Plugin split (tracked for v4)
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Long-term, we intend to split the npm package into separately auditable
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modules. See the v4 milestone in the GitHub issue tracker for the tracking
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issue.
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