chore: import upstream snapshot with attribution

2026-07-13 12:12:13 +08:00
commit 0446c45d8e
898 changed files with 328024 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+"""
+Behavioral authorization tests for R1 (beyond the blanket default-deny gate):
+
+  * admin scope    - monitor destructive actions require an admin principal;
+                     a valid data-scope token is allowed past the gate but
+                     rejected (403) by require_admin.
+  * MCP no-laundering - the MCP tool proxy authenticates its internal loopback
+                     call (it no longer relies on the endpoints being open).
+  * job ownership  - a task records its owner; a different requester gets 404
+                     (not 403), and an admin can read any task.
+
+These exercise the running app, not its source text.
+"""
+
+import pytest
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.posture
+
+from auth import create_access_token  # noqa: E402
+
+
+def _bearer(token: str) -> dict:
+    return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+
+
+# ───────────────────────────── admin scope ─────────────────────────────
+class TestAdminScope:
+    def test_data_scope_cannot_reset_stats(self, stock_client):
+        data_tok = create_access_token({"sub": "user@x.com"}, scope="data")
+        r = stock_client.post("/monitor/stats/reset", headers=_bearer(data_tok))
+        assert r.status_code == 403, f"data-scope reached admin action: {r.status_code}"
+
+    def test_data_scope_cannot_kill_browser(self, stock_client):
+        data_tok = create_access_token({"sub": "user@x.com"}, scope="data")
+        r = stock_client.post(
+            "/monitor/actions/kill_browser", json={"sig": "abc"}, headers=_bearer(data_tok)
+        )
+        assert r.status_code == 403
+
+    def test_admin_scope_passes_require_admin(self, stock_client):
+        admin_tok = create_access_token({"sub": "ops@x.com"}, scope="admin")
+        r = stock_client.post("/monitor/stats/reset", headers=_bearer(admin_tok))
+        # Past require_admin: not a 401/403. (500 acceptable here: no monitor
+        # singleton without a lifespan — the point is authz let it through.)
+        assert r.status_code not in (401, 403), f"admin blocked: {r.status_code}"
+
+    def test_unauthenticated_admin_action_is_401(self, stock_client):
+        r = stock_client.post("/monitor/stats/reset")
+        assert r.status_code == 401
+
+
+# ────────────────────────── MCP no-laundering ──────────────────────────
+class TestMcpNoLaundering:
+    def test_mcp_proxy_attaches_service_credential(self):
+        """The internal loopback proxy must carry a valid, data-scope token."""
+        import mcp_bridge
+        from auth import decode_token
+
+        headers = mcp_bridge._service_auth_headers()
+        assert "Authorization" in headers
+        scheme, _, token = headers["Authorization"].partition(" ")
+        assert scheme == "Bearer" and token
+        claims = decode_token(token)
+        assert claims["scope"] == "data", "MCP service token must not be admin-scoped"
+
+    def test_mcp_base_url_is_loopback(self, server_module):
+        """The MCP proxy must target loopback, never the 0.0.0.0 bind address."""
+        import inspect
+        src = inspect.getsource(server_module)
+        assert "http://127.0.0.1:" in src
+        assert 'base_url=f"http://{config' not in src
+
+
+# ─────────────────────────── job ownership ─────────────────────────────
+class _FakeRedis:
+    """Minimal async Redis stub holding one task hash."""
+
+    def __init__(self, task):
+        # Real redis returns bytes keys/values; decode_redis_hash expects that.
+        self._task = {k.encode(): str(v).encode() for k, v in task.items()}
+
+    async def hgetall(self, key):
+        return dict(self._task)
+
+    async def delete(self, key):
+        self._task = {}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+class TestJobOwnership:
+    async def _status(self, task, **kw):
+        import api
+        redis = _FakeRedis(task)
+        return await api.handle_task_status(
+            redis, "crawl_abc", base_url="http://t/", keep=True, **kw
+        )
+
+    async def test_owner_can_read_own_task(self):
+        task = {"status": "completed", "created_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00",
+                "url": "[]", "result": "{}", "owner": "alice@x.com"}
+        resp = await self._status(task, requester="alice@x.com", is_admin=False)
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+
+    async def test_other_requester_gets_404_not_403(self):
+        from fastapi import HTTPException
+        task = {"status": "completed", "created_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00",
+                "url": "[]", "result": "{}", "owner": "alice@x.com"}
+        with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
+            await self._status(task, requester="mallory@x.com", is_admin=False)
+        assert exc.value.status_code == 404  # not 403: don't reveal existence
+
+    async def test_admin_can_read_any_task(self):
+        task = {"status": "completed", "created_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00",
+                "url": "[]", "result": "{}", "owner": "alice@x.com"}
+        resp = await self._status(task, requester="ops@x.com", is_admin=True)
+        assert resp.status_code == 200