ruvnet--ruview/docs/research/BFLD

BFLD Research Bundle — Beamforming Feedback Layer for Detection

BFLD is the safety layer that detects when RF data becomes identifying. It sits between raw 802.11 beamforming feedback (BFI) and every downstream consumer — home automation, MQTT, Matter, cloud — measuring the identity-leakage potential of each frame and gating what leaves the node. It does not produce identity; it guards against accidental or adversarial exposure of identity.

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Table of Contents

File	Purpose
01-sota-survey.md	State-of-the-art literature: BFI vs CSI, attack tooling, identity-inference research, privacy-preserving techniques
02-soul.md	Architectural intent, ethical stance, three non-negotiable invariants
03-security-threat-model.md	Adversary classes, attack trees, mitigations, trust-boundary diagram, per-privacy-class analysis
04-privacy-gating.md	privacy_class byte semantics, hash rotation algorithm, embedding lifecycle, wire-format diffs
05-automation-integration.md	Home Assistant entities, Matter clusters, MQTT ACLs, cognitum federation
06-implementation-plan.md	New crate layout, reuse map, ESP32 additions, test plan, phased rollout
07-benchmarks-and-evaluation.md	Datasets, metrics, red-team protocol, comparison baselines
08-adr-draft.md	Draft ADR-118 for formal project adoption
09-github-issue.md	GitHub issue draft for tracking implementation
10-gist.md	Public-facing one-pager / blog summary

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Executive Summary

1. Problem. IEEE 802.11ac/ax beamforming feedback (BFI) — the compressed angle matrices (Phi/Psi, Givens rotation) exchanged between client and AP — is transmitted unencrypted on the management plane. Academic work (BFId at ACM CCS 2025, LeakyBeam at NDSS 2025) demonstrates that a passive sniffer with commodity hardware can re-identify individuals and infer occupancy through walls using only these frames. Existing CSI-based sensing pipelines have no explicit layer to detect when their output crosses from "motion event" into "identity record."

2. Approach. BFLD is a new crate (wifi-densepose-bfld) that wraps the BFI extraction and normalization path in an identity-leakage estimator. Every output frame carries a computed identity_risk_score and a privacy_class byte; downstream consumers decide whether to act based on those tags rather than on raw measurements.

3. Novel contribution. BFLD does not try to suppress identity inference — it tries to measure it continuously and make the measurement explicit in every event. This transforms a latent, silent risk into an observable, auditable signal. The combination of per-day per-site hash rotation and a local-only identity embedding creates structural impossibility of cross-site re-identification — not merely a policy promise.

4. Security posture. Raw BFI never leaves the node. Identity embeddings live only in an in-RAM ring buffer. The rf_signature_hash rotates daily using a per-site blake3 keyed-hash that is never transmitted. Matter and HA expose only presence, motion, and person_count — never risk scores or embeddings.

5. Integration plan. Six phases: P1 frame format + extractor stub, P2 feature extraction + identity_risk, P3 privacy gate + MQTT, P4 HA integration, P5 Matter exposure, P6 cognitum federation. Each phase maps to a numbered acceptance criterion. The crate slots into the existing workspace between wifi-densepose-signal and wifi-densepose-sensing-server.