ruvnet--ruflo/plugins/ruflo-aidefence

ruflo-aidefence

AI safety scanning, PII detection, prompt injection defense, and adaptive threat learning.

Install

/plugin marketplace add ruvnet/ruflo
/plugin install ruflo-aidefence@ruflo

Features

• Safety scanning: Detect prompt injection, jailbreak attempts, and adversarial content
• PII detection: Flag emails, SSNs, API keys, and other sensitive data
• Adaptive learning: Train defenses on confirmed threats to improve detection
• Threat classification: Categorize threats with confidence scores

Defense-in-depth pairing (ruflo 3.6.25+)

This plugin pairs with three runtime hardening features that ship in the host (ADR-095 / ADR-096 / audit_1776853149979):

• Loader-hijack denylist — validateEnv() rejects LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LD_AUDIT, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_FALLBACK_LIBRARY_PATH, DYLD_FORCE_FLAT_NAMESPACE, NODE_OPTIONS, NODE_PATH at the terminal_create MCP boundary. Adding any of these to a child process is functionally RCE; threat scoring should treat a denylist-enforcing host as substantially less exposed.
• File mode 0600 / dir mode 0700 on session, terminal, and memory stores via fs-secure.writeFileRestricted — cross-user-on-host reads blocked at the OS layer.
• Encryption at rest (opt-in via CLAUDE_FLOW_ENCRYPT_AT_REST=1) — AES-256-GCM with magic-byte (RFE1) backward-compat sniff. Reports involving memory.db / sessions / terminal-history exfiltration should account for the gate state (ruflo doctor -c encryption).

Commands

• /aidefence -- Detection stats and threat analysis dashboard

Skills

• safety-scan -- Scan inputs for prompt injection and unsafe content
• pii-detect -- Detect PII in text, code, and configurations

Compatibility

• CLI: pinned to @claude-flow/cli v3.6 major+minor.
• MCP surface: 6 aidefence_* tools (scan, analyze, stats, learn, is_safe, has_pii) plus transfer_detect-pii for categorized findings.
• Verification: bash plugins/ruflo-aidefence/scripts/smoke.sh is the contract.

The 3-gate pattern (canonical)

Every consumer plugin handling untrusted content should apply these three gates in order:

#	Gate	Tool	When
1	Pre-storage PII	aidefence_has_pii	Before any AgentDB / memory_store write — redact or quarantine before persistence.
2	Sanitization	aidefence_scan	For cookies, tokens, high-entropy blobs — vault behind an opaque handle rather than embed raw values.
3	Prompt-injection	aidefence_is_safe	Before any extracted text re-enters an LLM prompt — quarantine to findings.md if flagged.

This is the pattern ruflo-browser ADR-0001 §4 codified and ruflo-aidefence ADR-0001 canonicalizes. Reference these gates by name in any new plugin that handles user-supplied content.

What the gates catch (after ADR-118)

The upstream aidefence@2.3.0 / aimds-*@0.1.1 release (shipped 2026-05-14) widens the detection net without changing the MCP-tool surface. Gate 3 (aidefence_is_safe) now flags:

Category	Sample input
Prompt injection (0..4 modifier-word window)	ignore all previous instructions, forget every rule above, disregard the system prompt
Role hijack	you are now …, act as …, pretend to be …
Jailbreak markers	DAN mode, developer mode, god mode, root mode

aidefence_stats now also reports accurate total_mitigations and successful_mitigations (previously hardcoded 0 — an unclosed TODO that's now backed by AtomicU64 counters).

Namespace coordination

This plugin owns the security-patterns AgentDB namespace (kebab-case, follows the convention from ruflo-agentdb ADR-0001 §"Namespace convention"). Reserved namespaces (pattern, claude-memories, default) MUST NOT be shadowed.

Verification

bash plugins/ruflo-aidefence/scripts/smoke.sh
# Expected: "10 passed, 0 failed"

Architecture Decisions

• ADR-0001 — ruflo-aidefence plugin contract (pinning, namespace coordination, 3-gate pattern, smoke as contract)