/** * Tests for PluginIntegrityVerifier (ADR-145 P1, ruvnet/ruflo#2254). * * Covers: * - canonicalize is deterministic (key order doesn't change the digest) * - findAnchor matches by exact key, by exact-id scope, and by glob scope * - findAnchor rejects expired anchors * - verify reports `signature-missing` for unsigned manifests * - verify reports `manifest-hash-mismatch` when the manifest is tampered * - verify reports `unknown-signer` when the key isn't in trust anchors * - verify reports `pass` on a valid round-trip sign → verify * - verify reports `signature-invalid` on a flipped signature byte */ import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll } from 'vitest'; import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'; import { PluginIntegrityVerifier, canonicalize, hashManifest, findAnchor, type PluginManifest, type SignedPluginManifest, type TrustAnchor, type TrustAnchors, } from '../src/plugins/integrity-verifier.js'; // ─── helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── let ed: typeof import('@noble/ed25519') | null = null; beforeAll(async () => { try { ed = await import('@noble/ed25519'); if (!ed.etc.sha512Sync) { ed.etc.sha512Sync = (...m: Uint8Array[]) => { const h = createHash('sha512'); for (const x of m) h.update(x); return h.digest(); }; } } catch { ed = null; } }); function hex(b: Uint8Array): string { return Array.from(b, x => x.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join(''); } async function makeSigner(): Promise<{ priv: Uint8Array; pub: string }> { if (!ed) throw new Error('ed25519 not available'); const priv = ed.utils.randomPrivateKey(); const pub = hex(await ed.getPublicKey(priv)); return { priv, pub }; } async function sign( manifest: PluginManifest, priv: Uint8Array, pub: string, ): Promise { if (!ed) throw new Error('ed25519 not available'); const manifestHash = hashManifest(manifest); const sig = await ed.sign(hexBytes(manifestHash), priv); return { manifest, manifestHash, signature: hex(sig), publicKey: pub }; } function hexBytes(h: string): Uint8Array { const out = new Uint8Array(h.length / 2); for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) out[i] = parseInt(h.substr(i * 2, 2), 16); return out; } function anchorsFor(pub: string, scope = '*'): TrustAnchors { return { version: 1, anchors: [{ publicKey: pub, owner: 'test', scope }], }; } // ─── canonicalize ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── describe('canonicalize — deterministic JSON for hashing', () => { it('orders keys deterministically at every level', () => { const a = canonicalize({ b: 1, a: 2, c: { y: 1, x: 2 } }); const b = canonicalize({ a: 2, c: { x: 2, y: 1 }, b: 1 }); expect(a).toBe(b); }); it('arrays preserve order', () => { expect(canonicalize({ k: [3, 1, 2] })).toBe('{"k":[3,1,2]}'); }); it('different content yields different output', () => { expect(canonicalize({ a: 1 })).not.toBe(canonicalize({ a: 2 })); }); }); // ─── findAnchor ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────── describe('findAnchor — trust resolution', () => { const NOW = Date.now(); it('matches by exact key + matching exact scope', () => { const anchors: TrustAnchor[] = [ { publicKey: 'PK', owner: 'o', scope: '@claude-flow/memory' }, ]; expect(findAnchor(anchors, '@claude-flow/memory', 'PK', NOW)).not.toBeNull(); }); it('matches by exact key + wildcard scope', () => { const anchors: TrustAnchor[] = [{ publicKey: 'PK', owner: 'o', scope: '@claude-flow/*' }]; expect(findAnchor(anchors, '@claude-flow/anything', 'PK', NOW)).not.toBeNull(); }); it('rejects exact-key with out-of-scope plugin id', () => { const anchors: TrustAnchor[] = [ { publicKey: 'PK', owner: 'o', scope: '@claude-flow/*' }, ]; expect(findAnchor(anchors, '@third-party/x', 'PK', NOW)).toBeNull(); }); it('rejects wrong key even if scope matches', () => { const anchors: TrustAnchor[] = [{ publicKey: 'PK', owner: 'o', scope: '*' }]; expect(findAnchor(anchors, 'anything', 'OTHER', NOW)).toBeNull(); }); it('rejects expired anchor', () => { const anchors: TrustAnchor[] = [ { publicKey: 'PK', owner: 'o', scope: '*', expiresAt: '2020-01-01' }, ]; expect(findAnchor(anchors, 'x', 'PK', NOW)).toBeNull(); }); }); // ─── verify ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── describe('PluginIntegrityVerifier.verify', () => { const skipMsg = '@noble/ed25519 unavailable — skipping signature round-trip tests'; it('returns signature-missing when signature is empty', async () => { const v = new PluginIntegrityVerifier({ trustAnchors: anchorsFor('PK') }); const r = await v.verify({ manifest: { id: 'p', version: '1.0.0' }, manifestHash: 'abc', signature: '', publicKey: 'PK', }); expect(r.status).toBe('signature-missing'); expect(r.pluginId).toBe('p'); }); it('returns manifest-hash-mismatch when the manifest is tampered', async () => { if (!ed) { console.warn(skipMsg); return; } const { priv, pub } = await makeSigner(); const signed = await sign({ id: 'p', version: '1.0.0' }, priv, pub); // Tamper: change the manifest after signing const tampered: SignedPluginManifest = { ...signed, manifest: { id: 'p', version: '1.0.0', extra: 'sneaky' }, }; const v = new PluginIntegrityVerifier({ trustAnchors: anchorsFor(pub) }); const r = await v.verify(tampered); expect(r.status).toBe('manifest-hash-mismatch'); }); it('returns unknown-signer when the publicKey is not in trust anchors', async () => { if (!ed) { console.warn(skipMsg); return; } const { priv, pub } = await makeSigner(); const signed = await sign({ id: 'p', version: '1.0.0' }, priv, pub); const v = new PluginIntegrityVerifier({ trustAnchors: anchorsFor('OTHER-PUBLIC-KEY'), }); const r = await v.verify(signed); expect(r.status).toBe('unknown-signer'); }); it('passes a valid round-trip sign → verify', async () => { if (!ed) { console.warn(skipMsg); return; } const { priv, pub } = await makeSigner(); const signed = await sign({ id: 'p', version: '1.0.0' }, priv, pub); const v = new PluginIntegrityVerifier({ trustAnchors: anchorsFor(pub) }); const r = await v.verify(signed); expect(r.status).toBe('pass'); expect(r.signerFingerprint).toBe(pub.slice(0, 16)); }); it('returns signature-invalid when a signature byte is flipped', async () => { if (!ed) { console.warn(skipMsg); return; } const { priv, pub } = await makeSigner(); const signed = await sign({ id: 'p', version: '1.0.0' }, priv, pub); // Flip the first byte of the signature const flipped = signed.signature.slice(0, 2) === 'ff' ? '00' : 'ff'; const tampered = { ...signed, signature: flipped + signed.signature.slice(2) }; const v = new PluginIntegrityVerifier({ trustAnchors: anchorsFor(pub) }); const r = await v.verify(tampered); expect(r.status).toBe('signature-invalid'); }); });