# Isolation configuration for execd.
#
# Usage:
#   execd --isolation-config /etc/execd/isolation.toml
#   EXECD_ISOLATION_CONFIG=/etc/execd/isolation.toml execd
#
# All fields are optional. Missing fields use the defaults shown below.
# If no config file is specified, all built-in defaults are used.

# Parent directory for per-session overlay upper directories.
upper_root = "/var/lib/execd/isolation"

# Hard limit on total upper directory size across all sessions (bytes).
upper_max_bytes = 8589934592  # 8 GiB

# Maximum tar.gz diff output size (bytes). Phase 2.
diff_max_bytes = 4294967296  # 4 GiB

# Host paths callers may request via extra_writable or binds. Sources are
# enforced against the fully symlink-resolved real path; subpaths are allowed.
# NOTE: this key REPLACES the built-in default (no merge), so setting it here
# overrides the defaults below. Empty ([]) rejects all extra_writable/binds.
# Built-in default: ["/workspace", "/mnt", "/media", "/data"].
allowed_writable = ["/workspace", "/mnt", "/media", "/data"]

# Seccomp is ALWAYS ACTIVE by default — the built-in denylist blocks ~30
# dangerous syscalls (mount, ptrace, bpf, etc.) even without this section.
#
# Only add [seccomp] if you need to REPLACE the built-in denylist with a
# custom one. When present, deny COMPLETELY REPLACES the built-in list —
# no merging. Syscalls not present on the current architecture are silently
# skipped.
#
# Built-in default denylist for reference:
#
# [seccomp]
# deny = [
#   # Filesystem manipulation
#   "mount", "umount2", "chroot", "pivot_root",
#
#   # Process introspection / manipulation
#   "ptrace", "process_vm_readv", "process_vm_writev", "kcmp",
#
#   # Kernel module loading
#   "init_module", "finit_module", "delete_module",
#
#   # BPF / seccomp manipulation
#   "bpf", "seccomp",
#
#   # Execution domain
#   "personality",
#
#   # Kernel key management
#   "add_key", "request_key", "keyctl",
#
#   # I/O privilege
#   "iopl", "ioperm",
#
#   # System state
#   "reboot", "syslog", "swapon", "swapoff",
#
#   # Namespace manipulation
#   "setns", "unshare",
#
#   # Handle-based operations
#   "name_to_handle_at", "open_by_handle_at",
#
#   # Other potentially dangerous
#   "userfaultfd", "kexec_load", "kexec_file_load", "acct",
# ]