Multi-round tool result: on the 2026-07-28 protocol a tool that needs user input mid-call returns resultType: "input_required" with embedded inputRequests and an opaque requestState, instead of pushing a server-to-client request. The client fulfils the embedded requests and retries the original tools/call carrying inputResponses and the echoed requestState. The story shows both the Client auto-loop (one await call_tool, callbacks fired transparently) and a manual client.session loop (the persistable form). Because requestState round-trips through the client, it also shows the security surface that protects it: MCPServer seals state by default under a process-local key, handlers keep writing plaintext, and the wire only ever carries an opaque token. The manual loop tampers with the sealed token to show what a forged echo gets back.

Run it

# HTTP: the client self-hosts the server on a free port, runs, then tears it
# down (the InputRequiredResult round-trip is 2026-era only)
uv run python -m stories.mrtr.client --http
# same, against the lowlevel-API server variant
uv run python -m stories.mrtr.client --http --server server_lowlevel

What to look at

server.py build_server: no security configuration at all. The default seals under a key generated at process start, which is right for a single-process server like this one; a fleet (multi-worker or load-balanced) shares keys with request_state_security=RequestStateSecurity(keys=[...]) so any instance can verify state another minted.
server.py deploy: handlers stay plaintext. The first round returns InputRequiredResult(input_requests={...}, request_state="awaiting-confirm") and the retry asserts ctx.request_state == "awaiting-confirm". The tool never touches the crypto; the boundary seals on the way out and unseals the echo on the way back in.
client.py main: the auto-loop is invisible at the call site: Client(target, mode=mode, elicitation_callback=on_elicit) then await client.call_tool("deploy", ...). The same on_elicit callback the legacy push path uses is dispatched for each embedded inputRequests entry.
client.py manual block: client.session.call_tool(..., allow_input_required=True) returns the raw InputRequiredResult so request_state can be persisted between rounds. The wire value is an opaque sealed token, not the string the server code wrote. The client asserts exactly that, then retries with one character of the token flipped and gets the single frozen error every verification failure maps to: -32602, "Invalid or expired requestState", {"reason": "invalid_request_state"}. The specific reason (tampered tag, expiry, wrong request, wrong principal) appears only in the server's log, never on the wire. The untampered token then completes the round normally.
server_lowlevel.py: the lowlevel tier doesn't seal by default; the same enforcement is one appended middleware: server.middleware.append(RequestStateBoundary(RequestStateSecurity.ephemeral(), default_audience=server.name)).

Caveats

Loop bound. The auto-loop gives up after input_required_max_rounds (default 10) with InputRequiredRoundsExceededError; raise it on the Client ctor or drop to the manual loop.
The default key dies with the process. It is generated at startup and held only in memory, so a server restart (or a retry landing on a different instance) invalidates in-flight rounds: the client gets the same frozen rejection and must start the flow over. Use RequestStateSecurity(keys=[...]) when state must survive either.

Spec

Input required tool results (server features), Multi-round-trip requests (security patterns)

README.md

mrtr

Run it

What to look at

Caveats

Spec

See also