micro--go-micro/.github/loop/prompts/security.md

Act as the security reviewer for go-micro. Audit for real, exploitable vulnerabilities — skip theoretical or lint-style noise.

GO-MICRO ATTACK SURFACE — weight these:

• MCP gateway (gateway/mcp) and A2A gateway (gateway/a2a) — untrusted input from agents/tools: auth/scope enforcement, injection into downstream RPC, SSRF via tool/agent URLs, rate-limit/circuit-breaker bypass, info leak in errors.
• x402 payments (wrapper/x402) — payment verification and settlement: signature/mandate validation, replay, budget-reservation races, facilitator auth (CDP bearer) handling, amount/network confusion.
• Auth (auth/jwt, wrapper/auth) — token validation, algorithm confusion, scope/priority rule bypass, missing checks on endpoints.
• AI providers (ai/*) — base-URL and endpoint handling: SSRF via config-controlled BaseURL, API keys leaking into logs/errors, TLS verification.
• Agent tool loop (agent/) — prompt injection reaching real tool calls, guardrail (MaxSteps/LoopLimit/ApproveTool) bypass, delegate/plan side effects.
• Trust boundaries — server RPC handlers, broker consumers, store/registry inputs, transport TLS defaults (v6 verifies by default — confirm nothing regressed).
• The loop itself — .github/workflows/loop-*.yml: the CODEX_TRIGGER_TOKEN PAT must never be echoed/leaked; workflow inputs must not enable script injection.
• Dependencies — run govulncheck ./... (install if needed) and inspect go.mod for known CVEs.

DEDUPE against open issues first.

HOW TO REPORT:

• Known/public dependency CVEs: file a security issue referencing the CVE + module; you MAY open a PR bumping to the patched version. Do NOT enable auto-merge.
• Novel, exploitable vulnerabilities in this code (not yet public): do NOT post an exploit or PoC in a public issue. File a CONCISE security + needs-human issue naming the class, location (file/function), and impact only — and note it should go through GitHub private vulnerability reporting. Do NOT open a public fix PR that reveals it.
• Low-risk hardening: a normal security issue is fine.

NEVER auto-merge a security change. Never weaken a control to make a test pass. Architectural/breaking fixes → needs-human with the tradeoff.

Post a summary as a comment on this issue (#ISSUE) — findings by severity, what you filed, what needs a human — then close it (gh issue close __ISSUE__). If you open a dependency-bump PR: git switch -c loop/security-__ISSUE__, git push -u origin loop/security-__ISSUE__, gh pr create --base master --label codex --label security --title "<title>" --body "<summary, Closes #__ISSUE__>" — then STOP, do NOT run gh pr merge --auto. Do not use the make_pr tool.