""" Authentication Security Tests Tests that verify authentication mechanisms are secure, including password storage, session management, and access control. """ import pytest from tests.test_utils import add_src_to_path add_src_to_path() class TestPasswordSecurity: """Test password security and hashing.""" @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_password_hashing_uses_secure_algorithm(self): """ Test that passwords are hashed using a secure algorithm. LDR uses SQLCipher encryption for user databases. """ # LDR uses SQLCipher with user password as encryption key # This means the password is used to encrypt the database # Not stored as a hash, but used for encryption # Verify that password is not stored in plaintext # Verify that database encryption key derivation is secure assert True # Documentation test - SQLCipher handles this @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_password_minimum_requirements(self): """Test that password requirements are enforced (if applicable).""" # Password requirements to consider: # - Minimum length (e.g., 8-12 characters) # - Complexity (uppercase, lowercase, numbers, symbols) # - No common passwords # - No username in password # For local self-hosted tool, strict requirements may be optional # User is responsible for their own security # This is a documentation test for password policy pass @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_password_not_logged(self): """Test that passwords are never logged or exposed in errors.""" # Passwords should never appear in: # - Log files # - Error messages # - Debug output # - Stack traces # This is a security best practice assert True # Documentation test @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_timing_attack_resistance(self): """ Test that authentication timing is constant to prevent timing attacks. Timing attacks: - Attacker measures response time to guess valid usernames - Fast response: "User doesn't exist" - Slow response: "User exists, wrong password" Protection: - Constant-time password comparison - Same processing time for valid/invalid users """ # Most password hashing libraries (bcrypt, argon2) are timing-safe # SQLCipher should provide timing-safe comparison assert True # Documentation test class TestSessionSecurity: """Test session management security.""" @pytest.fixture def client(self): """Create a test client.""" from local_deep_research.web.app import create_app app, _ = create_app() # Unpack tuple (app, socket_service) app.config["TESTING"] = True app.config["SECRET_KEY"] = "test-secret-key" app.config["WTF_CSRF_ENABLED"] = False return app.test_client() @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_session_expiration(self, client): """Test that sessions expire appropriately.""" # Sessions should: # - Expire after inactivity timeout # - Have absolute maximum lifetime # - Be invalidated on logout # This prevents: # - Session hijacking # - Unauthorized access from old sessions # - Session fixation attacks pass # Placeholder - implementation depends on session manager @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_session_regeneration_on_login(self): """Test that session ID is regenerated after login.""" # Session fixation attack prevention: # 1. Attacker sets victim's session ID # 2. Victim logs in with that session ID # 3. Attacker uses same session ID to access victim's account # Protection: Regenerate session ID after authentication # Flask does this automatically on session modification assert True # Documentation test def test_logout_invalidates_session(self, client): """Test that logout completely invalidates the session.""" # Logout should: # 1. Clear session data # 2. Invalidate session token # 3. Clear session cookies # 4. Redirect to login page # Test logout endpoint response = client.post("/auth/logout") assert response.status_code == 302, response.status_code # After logout, protected pages should require re-authentication # This is tested in access control tests @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_concurrent_session_handling(self): """Test handling of concurrent sessions.""" # Concurrent session scenarios: # - User logs in from multiple devices # - User logs in from multiple browsers # - Old session while new session active # Options: # 1. Allow multiple sessions (lower security, better UX) # 2. Invalidate old session on new login (higher security) # 3. Limit number of concurrent sessions # For local tool, multiple sessions may be acceptable assert True # Documentation test class TestAccessControl: """Test access control and authorization.""" @pytest.fixture def client(self): """Create a test client.""" from local_deep_research.web.app import create_app app, _ = create_app() # Unpack tuple (app, socket_service) app.config["TESTING"] = True return app.test_client() def test_unauthenticated_access_blocked(self, client): """Test that protected resources require authentication.""" # Protected pages that should redirect to login: # - Research pages # - Settings pages # - User data pages # Public pages that don't require auth: # - Login page # - Registration page (if enabled) # - Health check endpoint # Test accessing protected resource without auth protected_endpoints = [ "/research", "/settings", "/api/v1/research", ] for endpoint in protected_endpoints: response = client.get(endpoint) # Should be one of the auth-block codes: # 302 Redirect to login, 401 Unauthorized, 403 Forbidden, # 404 Not Found (route hidden behind decorator). # MUST NOT be 200 — that would mean the endpoint is reachable # without authentication. assert response.status_code in {302, 401, 403, 404}, ( f"{endpoint} returned {response.status_code} without auth" ) @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_authentication_required_decorator(self): """Test that @login_required decorator is used on protected routes.""" # Flask routes should use authentication decorators: # - @login_required for authenticated routes # - Session validation on each request # This is enforced through code review and testing assert True # Documentation test @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_authorization_vs_authentication(self): """ Clarify difference between authentication and authorization. Authentication: Verifying user identity (who you are) - Login with username/password - Session token validation - User exists and credentials correct Authorization: Verifying user permissions (what you can do) - Can this user access this resource? - Does user have required role/permissions? - Resource ownership validation For single-user LDR instance, authorization is simpler (authenticated user has full access to their own data) For multi-user deployments, authorization becomes critical. """ assert True # Documentation test @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_user_data_isolation(self): """Test that users can only access their own data.""" # In multi-user scenario: # - User A should not access User B's research # - Database queries should filter by user # - User-specific encryption (SQLCipher per-user databases) # LDR uses per-user encrypted databases # This provides strong data isolation assert True # Documentation test class TestAuthenticationEdgeCases: """Test edge cases and attack scenarios.""" @pytest.fixture def client(self): """Create a test client.""" from local_deep_research.web.app import create_app app, _ = create_app() # Unpack tuple (app, socket_service) app.config["TESTING"] = True app.config["WTF_CSRF_ENABLED"] = False return app.test_client() def test_sql_injection_in_authentication(self, client): """Test that authentication is protected against SQL injection.""" # SQL injection in login form sql_injection_usernames = [ "admin' OR '1'='1", "admin'--", "' OR '1'='1'--", "admin' OR 1=1--", ] for username in sql_injection_usernames: response = client.post( "/auth/login", data={"username": username, "password": "anything"}, ) # Should not authenticate with SQL injection assert response.status_code == 401, response.status_code def test_empty_credentials_handling(self, client): """Test that empty username/password are rejected.""" # Empty username response1 = client.post( "/auth/login", data={"username": "", "password": "password"}, ) assert response1.status_code in [400, 401] # Empty password response2 = client.post( "/auth/login", data={"username": "admin", "password": ""}, ) assert response2.status_code in [400, 401] # Both empty response3 = client.post( "/auth/login", data={"username": "", "password": ""}, ) assert response3.status_code in [400, 401] @pytest.mark.skip(reason="documentation/placeholder test - not implemented") def test_authentication_security_documentation(): """ Documentation test for authentication security in LDR. Authentication Architecture: - SQLCipher encrypted per-user databases - User password = database encryption key - No centralized user authentication database - Each user has their own encrypted database Security Properties: - Strong encryption (SQLCipher) - Password not stored, used as encryption key - Data at rest encryption - User data isolation (separate databases) Threat Model: - Low risk for local single-user deployment - Medium risk if deployed as multi-user service - High risk if exposed to internet without additional protection Additional Security Measures: - HTTPS for production deployment - Firewall/VPN for remote access - Backup encryption - Secure key derivation (SQLCipher built-in) Not Applicable (due to architecture): - Password hashing/salting (password IS the encryption key) - Centralized user management - OAuth/SSO integration """ assert True # Documentation test