hmbown--codewhale/docs/WORKROOM_SECURITY.md

Workroom Security Model

Scope

This document covers the security boundaries of CodeWhale Workrooms — the durable, addressable containers for threaded agent conversations described in RFC 3209.

Workrooms do not introduce any new network services, cloud dependencies, or default-on public sharing. Security responsibility stays with the operator who controls the Runtime API.

This document describes the intended security contract for the v0.9 workroom surface. In v0.8.62, only protocol data types and link parsing have landed. Persistent state, Runtime API endpoints, token scoping, event storage, and model-visible link resolution remain follow-up work.

Principles

1. Local-first. Future persisted workroom state should live under the CodeWhale home directory, protected by user-only filesystem permissions. No cloud sync, no telemetry, no third-party hosting.

2. No secrets in links. codewhale://workroom/wr_... URLs contain only opaque UUIDs. They carry no API keys, bearer tokens, passwords, or file paths. An adversary with a workroom link can do nothing without Runtime API access.

3. No public read paths. Future workroom endpoints must require a valid bearer token in the Authorization header. There should be no unauthenticated /workroom/... route.

4. No secrets in events. WorkroomEvent payloads must never contain API keys, auth tokens, or plaintext credentials. The ArtifactLinked event kind references file paths, not contents. Events are intended for indexing/reference, not for replaying agent tool output.

5. Share is explicit. A workroom is Private by default. The operator may mark it Shared and list allowed bearer tokens. The operator controls which tokens are issued, rotated, and revoked.

Threat model

Threat	Mitigation
Attacker obtains a workroom link	Link contains only opaque UUID; resolution requires Runtime API auth
Attacker brute-forces workroom IDs	UUID v4 (2^122 space); future APIs should add rate limiting before exposing lookup surfaces
Attacker injects a malicious event	Future event writes should flow only through trusted Runtime clients
Attacker exfiltrates workroom state	Future filesystem state should be gated by OS user permissions and runtime auth
Bearer token leaks	Operator rotates tokens; future sharing rules should be revocable without touching workroom state

API auth

Future workroom endpoints should inherit the same auth middleware as other protected routes (/thread, /app, /tool, etc.):

• Authorization: Bearer <token> header required
• Token validated against the runtime's configured bearer token(s)
• 401 Unauthorized if missing or invalid

Future work

Item	Risk	Status
Event encryption at rest	In scope for Phase 2 if workrooms move to a multi-user model	Not implemented
Audit log for shared workrooms	Useful if shared tokens are used across operators	Not implemented
Token scoping (read/write/admin)	Currently all tokens have full access	Not planned