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github--spec-kit/tests/test_registrar_path_traversal.py
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2026-07-13 11:57:40 +08:00

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Python

"""Tests for CommandRegistrar directory traversal guards around issue #2229."""
import errno
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from specify_cli.agents import CommandRegistrar
from specify_cli._utils import relative_extension_path_violation
TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS = [
"../pwned",
"../../etc/passwd",
"subdir/../../escape",
"/absolute/evil",
]
def _write_source(ext_dir: Path) -> Path:
ext_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
(ext_dir / "commands").mkdir(exist_ok=True)
(ext_dir / "commands" / "cmd.md").write_text(
"---\ndescription: test\n---\n\nbody\n", encoding="utf-8"
)
return ext_dir
def _cmd(name: str, aliases: list[str] | None = None) -> dict[str, object]:
return {
"name": name,
"file": "commands/cmd.md",
"aliases": list(aliases or []),
}
def _project_and_source(tmp_path):
project = tmp_path / "project"
project.mkdir()
ext_dir = _write_source(tmp_path / "ext-src")
return project, ext_dir
def _assert_no_stray_files(tmp_root: Path, marker: str) -> None:
"""Fail if a file matching ``marker`` exists outside the project tree."""
stray = [
p for p in tmp_root.rglob("*")
if p.is_file() and marker in p.name and "project" not in p.parts
]
assert stray == [], (
f"Traversal payload leaked files outside the project tree: {stray}"
)
class TestPrimaryCommandTraversal:
"""Primary command names must not escape the agent's commands directory."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_name", TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS)
def test_gemini_rejects_traversal_in_primary_name(self, tmp_path, bad_name):
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escapes|outside|Invalid"):
registrar.register_commands(
"gemini", [_cmd(bad_name)], "myext", ext_dir, project
)
_assert_no_stray_files(tmp_path, Path(bad_name).name.replace("/", ""))
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_name", TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS)
def test_copilot_rejects_traversal_in_primary_name(self, tmp_path, bad_name):
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".github" / "agents").mkdir(parents=True)
(project / ".github" / "prompts").mkdir(parents=True)
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escapes|outside|Invalid"):
registrar.register_commands(
"copilot", [_cmd(bad_name)], "myext", ext_dir, project
)
_assert_no_stray_files(tmp_path, Path(bad_name).name.replace("/", ""))
class TestAliasTraversal:
"""Free-form aliases must not escape commands_dir (regression for b67b285)."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_alias", TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS)
def test_gemini_rejects_traversal_in_alias(self, tmp_path, bad_alias):
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escapes|outside|Invalid"):
registrar.register_commands(
"gemini",
[_cmd("speckit.myext.ok", [bad_alias])],
"myext",
ext_dir,
project,
)
_assert_no_stray_files(tmp_path, Path(bad_alias).name.replace("/", ""))
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_alias", TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS)
def test_copilot_rejects_traversal_in_alias(self, tmp_path, bad_alias):
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".github" / "agents").mkdir(parents=True)
(project / ".github" / "prompts").mkdir(parents=True)
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escapes|outside|Invalid"):
registrar.register_commands(
"copilot",
[_cmd("speckit.myext.ok", [bad_alias])],
"myext",
ext_dir,
project,
)
_assert_no_stray_files(tmp_path, Path(bad_alias).name.replace("/", ""))
class TestCopilotPromptTraversal:
"""`write_copilot_prompt` is a public static method — guard it directly."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_name", TRAVERSAL_PAYLOADS)
def test_rejects_traversal_names(self, tmp_path, bad_name):
project = tmp_path / "project"
(project / ".github" / "prompts").mkdir(parents=True)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escapes|outside|Invalid"):
CommandRegistrar.write_copilot_prompt(project, bad_name)
_assert_no_stray_files(tmp_path, Path(bad_name).name.replace("/", ""))
ABS_OUTSIDE = "__ABS_OUTSIDE__"
FILE_FIELD_PAYLOADS = [
"../outside.txt",
"../../outside.txt",
"commands/../../outside.txt",
"C:outside.txt",
ABS_OUTSIDE,
]
def _resolve_payload(bad_file: str, outside_file: Path) -> str:
"""Map the absolute-path sentinel to the real, existing outside file.
Using the temp file's own absolute path (instead of ``/etc/passwd``)
guarantees the file exists on every platform — so the test fails if the
absolute-path guard regresses, rather than passing because the target
happens not to exist (e.g. on Windows runners).
"""
return str(outside_file) if bad_file == ABS_OUTSIDE else bad_file
def _assert_no_marker_leak(project: Path, marker: str) -> None:
"""Fail if ``marker`` content was written into any file under ``project``."""
leaked = [
p for p in project.rglob("*")
if p.is_file() and marker in p.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")
]
assert leaked == [], f"Outside file leaked into generated command: {leaked}"
class TestCommandFileTraversal:
"""The manifest ``file`` field must not read files outside source_dir.
Regression for GHSA-w5fv-7w9x-7fc5: ``register_commands`` read
``source_dir / cmd_file`` with no containment check, so a manifest with
a traversal (``file: ../../../outside.txt``) or an absolute path read an
arbitrary host file verbatim into the generated agent command.
"""
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_file", FILE_FIELD_PAYLOADS)
def test_claude_skips_traversal_in_file_field(self, tmp_path, bad_file):
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".claude" / "skills").mkdir(parents=True)
outside_file = tmp_path / "outside.txt"
outside_file.write_text("OUTSIDE-FILE-MARKER", encoding="utf-8")
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
registered = registrar.register_commands(
"claude",
[{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": _resolve_payload(bad_file, outside_file), "aliases": []}],
"myext",
ext_dir,
project,
)
assert registered == []
_assert_no_marker_leak(project, "OUTSIDE-FILE-MARKER")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_file", FILE_FIELD_PAYLOADS)
def test_gemini_skips_traversal_in_file_field(self, tmp_path, bad_file):
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
outside_file = tmp_path / "outside.txt"
outside_file.write_text("OUTSIDE-FILE-MARKER", encoding="utf-8")
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
registered = registrar.register_commands(
"gemini",
[{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": _resolve_payload(bad_file, outside_file), "aliases": []}],
"myext",
ext_dir,
project,
)
assert registered == []
_assert_no_marker_leak(project, "OUTSIDE-FILE-MARKER")
@pytest.mark.parametrize("bad_value", [None, 123, "", ["x"]])
def test_non_string_file_is_skipped(self, tmp_path, bad_value):
"""A non-string/empty ``file`` must be skipped, not raise TypeError."""
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
registered = registrar.register_commands(
"gemini",
[{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": bad_value, "aliases": []}],
"myext",
ext_dir,
project,
)
assert registered == []
def test_dotdot_rejected_even_when_target_is_in_bounds(self, tmp_path):
"""An in-bounds ``..`` payload is rejected by the ``..`` check itself.
``commands/../cmd.md`` resolves to ``ext_dir/cmd.md`` — inside
source_dir — so the resolve()/relative_to() containment backstop would
allow it. Creating that target file ensures the command is skipped
because of the ``..`` rejection, not merely because the file is absent.
"""
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
(ext_dir / "cmd.md").write_text(
"---\ndescription: test\n---\n\nbody\n", encoding="utf-8"
)
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
registered = registrar.register_commands(
"gemini",
[{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": "commands/../cmd.md", "aliases": []}],
"myext",
ext_dir,
project,
)
assert registered == []
class TestRelativeExtensionPathPolicy:
"""Unit tests for the shared ``relative_extension_path_violation`` policy."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"value",
[
"commands/hello.md",
"hello.md",
"a/b/c/hello.md",
],
)
def test_safe_relative_paths_have_no_violation(self, value):
assert relative_extension_path_violation(value) is None
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"value",
[
None,
123,
["x"],
"",
" ",
" hello.md",
"hello.md ",
"/abs/outside.md",
"/etc/passwd",
"C:foo.md",
"C:\\Windows\\system32",
"\\\\server\\share\\x.md",
"../escape.md",
"commands/../../escape.md",
],
)
def test_unsafe_values_report_violation(self, value):
assert relative_extension_path_violation(value) is not None
class TestReadSkipWarning:
"""Unregisterable but in-bounds files warn instead of failing silently."""
def test_unreadable_target_warns_and_skips(self, tmp_path):
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".gemini" / "commands").mkdir(parents=True)
(ext_dir / "cmd.md").write_bytes(b"\xff\xfe\x00\x80bad")
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
with pytest.warns(UserWarning):
registered = registrar.register_commands(
"gemini",
[{"name": "speckit.myext.hello", "file": "cmd.md", "aliases": []}],
"myext",
ext_dir,
project,
)
assert registered == []
def test_symlinked_subdir_under_commands_dir_is_preserved(self, tmp_path):
"""Lexical check must not block legitimately symlinked sub-directories.
Teams sometimes symlink shared skills into their agent commands dir
(e.g. ``.gemini/commands/shared -> /team/shared-commands``). The
guard is purely lexical, so such a setup continues to work even though
the resolved target lives outside commands_dir on disk.
"""
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
commands_dir = project / ".gemini" / "commands"
commands_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
external_shared = tmp_path / "external-shared"
external_shared.mkdir()
try:
(commands_dir / "shared").symlink_to(
external_shared, target_is_directory=True
)
except OSError as exc:
if exc.errno in {errno.EPERM, errno.EACCES}:
pytest.skip("symlink creation is not permitted in this environment")
raise
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
registered = registrar.register_commands(
"gemini",
[_cmd("shared/hello")],
"myext",
ext_dir,
project,
)
assert registered == ["shared/hello"]
assert (external_shared / "hello.toml").exists()
def test_safe_command_and_alias_still_register(self, tmp_path):
project, ext_dir = _project_and_source(tmp_path)
(project / ".claude" / "skills").mkdir(parents=True)
registrar = CommandRegistrar()
registered = registrar.register_commands(
"claude",
[_cmd("speckit.myext.hello", ["speckit.myext.hi"])],
"myext",
ext_dir,
project,
)
assert "speckit.myext.hello" in registered
assert "speckit.myext.hi" in registered
assert (
project
/ ".claude"
/ "skills"
/ "speckit-myext-hello"
/ "SKILL.md"
).exists()
assert (
project
/ ".claude"
/ "skills"
/ "speckit-myext-hi"
/ "SKILL.md"
).exists()