wehub-resource-sync
105 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
105 lines
4.3 KiB
TypeScript
// SSRF regression guard for the Deno Deploy relay worker (PR #4643 follow-up).
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//
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// The generated edge worker reads an attacker-controlled `x-relay-path` header
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// and previously appended it to the (validated) `x-relay-target` origin via
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// string concatenation: `fetch(target.replace(/\/$/, "") + relayPath)`. That
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// lets the caller smuggle a NEW host past the allow/SSRF check using userinfo
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// (`@`), a backslash, or a protocol-relative path:
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// - x-relay-target: https://api.anthropic.com (passes the host guard)
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// - x-relay-path: //evil.com/x → fetches https://evil.com/x
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// - x-relay-path: /x@evil.com → userinfo confusion
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// - x-relay-path: \evil.com → backslash host confusion
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//
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// The fix resolves the path against the validated target with `new URL()` and
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// re-checks that the resolved host/credentials still match the target. The
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// path-resolution decision is exported as the pure `resolveRelayTarget()` so it
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// can be unit-tested directly (the worker body — a Deno-runtime string — embeds
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// the SAME function source, asserted below by diffing the generated worker).
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import { describe, it } from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import {
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resolveRelayTarget,
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__buildRelayWorkerForTest,
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} from "../../src/app/api/settings/proxy/deno-deploy/route";
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const TARGET = "https://api.anthropic.com";
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describe("resolveRelayTarget — SSRF-safe path join", () => {
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it("accepts a legitimate absolute path and keeps the validated host", () => {
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const r = resolveRelayTarget(TARGET, "/v1/foo");
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assert.equal(r.ok, true, "a normal path must pass");
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if (r.ok) {
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assert.equal(r.url, "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/foo");
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}
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});
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it("accepts a path with a query string", () => {
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const r = resolveRelayTarget(TARGET, "/v1/messages?beta=true");
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assert.equal(r.ok, true);
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if (r.ok) {
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assert.equal(r.url, "https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages?beta=true");
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}
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});
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it("rejects a protocol-relative path that swaps the host (//evil.com/x)", () => {
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const r = resolveRelayTarget(TARGET, "//evil.com/x");
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assert.equal(r.ok, false, "//evil.com must NOT be allowed to change the host");
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if (!r.ok) assert.equal(r.status, 403);
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});
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it("rejects a path containing userinfo (/x@evil.com)", () => {
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const r = resolveRelayTarget(TARGET, "/x@evil.com");
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assert.equal(r.ok, false, "@ in the path must be rejected");
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if (!r.ok) assert.equal(r.status, 403);
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});
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it("rejects a backslash host-confusion path (\\evil.com)", () => {
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const r = resolveRelayTarget(TARGET, "\\evil.com");
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assert.equal(r.ok, false, "backslash must be rejected");
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if (!r.ok) assert.equal(r.status, 403);
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});
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it("rejects a value that does not start with '/'", () => {
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const r = resolveRelayTarget(TARGET, "evil.com/x");
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assert.equal(r.ok, false, "a path must start with '/'");
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if (!r.ok) assert.equal(r.status, 403);
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});
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it("rejects an embedded-credentials path that resolves a different host", () => {
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// Classic userinfo trick: everything before '@' becomes userinfo, the real
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// host is after it.
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const r = resolveRelayTarget(TARGET, "/@evil.com/path");
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assert.equal(r.ok, false);
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if (!r.ok) assert.equal(r.status, 403);
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});
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it("rejects backslash-prefixed protocol-relative (\\\\evil.com)", () => {
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const r = resolveRelayTarget(TARGET, "\\\\evil.com/x");
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assert.equal(r.ok, false);
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if (!r.ok) assert.equal(r.status, 403);
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});
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});
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describe("buildRelayWorker — generated worker has no string-concat SSRF hole", () => {
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it("does not concatenate the target with the raw relay path", () => {
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const worker = __buildRelayWorkerForTest("deadbeefcafe");
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// The vulnerable pattern was: target.replace(/\/$/, "") + relayPath
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assert.ok(
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!/\.replace\(\s*\/\\?\/\$\/\s*,\s*["']{2}\s*\)\s*\+\s*relayPath/.test(worker),
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"worker must not append relayPath to target by string concatenation"
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);
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assert.ok(
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!worker.includes('+ relayPath'),
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"worker must not contain `+ relayPath` string concatenation"
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);
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});
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it("embeds the resolveRelayTarget guard into the worker body", () => {
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const worker = __buildRelayWorkerForTest("deadbeefcafe");
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assert.ok(
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worker.includes("resolveRelayTarget"),
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"the worker must call the shared resolveRelayTarget guard"
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);
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});
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});
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