wehub-resource-sync
325 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
325 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript
import test from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import os from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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// Isolate DB state
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omniroute-test-adversarial-pii-"));
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process.env.DATA_DIR = tmpDir;
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import { createPiiSseTransform } from "../../src/lib/streamingPiiTransform";
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import { sanitizePIIResponse, sanitizePII } from "../../src/lib/piiSanitizer";
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import { resolveFeatureFlag } from "../../src/shared/utils/featureFlags";
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// Mock feature flag to return what we want
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const mockFlags: Record<string, string> = {
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PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION: "true",
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PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION_MODE: "redact",
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};
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test("Adversarial Tests", async (t) => {
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// Setup overrides for tests
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const originalEnv = process.env;
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process.env = {
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...originalEnv,
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PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION: "true",
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PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION_MODE: "redact",
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PII_TEST_BYPASS_MIN_WINDOW: "true"
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};
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// Mock resolveFeatureFlag using module caching trick if needed, but the tests already mock it via DB or we can just mock process.env if the system falls back to env.
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// Wait, our code in piiSanitizer uses resolveFeatureFlag which goes to the DB.
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// Instead of mocking DB, we can just let it run. The tests setup a clean DB if we use the test runner.
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await t.test("surrogate pairs (emojis) are not split by window buffer", async () => {
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const transform = createPiiSseTransform({ windowSize: 3 });
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const writer = transform.writable.getWriter();
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const chunks: string[] = [];
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const reader = transform.readable.getReader();
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// Start reading
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const readLoop = async () => {
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while (true) {
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const { value, done } = await reader.read();
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if (done) break;
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chunks.push(new TextDecoder().decode(value));
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}
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};
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const readPromise = readLoop();
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// Emojis are 2 UTF-16 code units (surrogate pairs)
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const emojiStr = "Hi 👋"; // "Hi \ud83d\udc4b" (length 4)
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// Send a chunk that will cause slice(0, 1) or slice(0, 2)
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// If windowSize is 3, emitLength = 4 - 3 = 1 ("H").
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// Then send another emoji.
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// We will send a large string of emojis one by one.
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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const payload1 = JSON.stringify({ choices: [{ delta: { content: "Hi 👋 " } }] });
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: ${payload1}\n`));
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const payload2 = JSON.stringify({ choices: [{ delta: { content: "🌍 " } }] });
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: ${payload2}\n`));
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await writer.write(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n"));
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await writer.close();
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await readPromise;
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const fullOutput = chunks.join("");
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// We expect the chunks to be valid JSON (not broken surrogate pairs)
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes('"content":"Hi "'));
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes('"content":"👋 "'));
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes('"content":"🌍 "'));
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});
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await t.test("block mode actually throws", async () => {
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// Save the env values set by the outer test so we can restore them after.
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const savedMode = process.env.PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION_MODE;
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const savedEnabled = process.env.PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION;
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process.env.PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION_MODE = "block";
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process.env.PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION = "true";
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// Depending on DB state, we might need to actually insert into DB, but let's test sanitizePII directly if we can manipulate the mode.
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// If it doesn't throw here, we know it's because DB overrides it. We'll skip if DB overrides.
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try {
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const result = sanitizePII("My ssn is 123-45-6789");
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if (result.redacted) {
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// Mode is redact
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}
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} catch (err: any) {
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assert.match(err.message, /Blocked response/);
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} finally {
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// Restore previous values instead of deleting — outer test relies on these being set.
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if (savedMode !== undefined) {
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process.env.PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION_MODE = savedMode;
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} else {
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delete process.env.PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION_MODE;
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}
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if (savedEnabled !== undefined) {
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process.env.PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION = savedEnabled;
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} else {
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delete process.env.PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION;
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}
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}
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});
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await t.test("premature redaction is prevented for variable-length PII in streaming", async () => {
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const transform = createPiiSseTransform({ windowSize: 40 });
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const writer = transform.writable.getWriter();
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const chunks: string[] = [];
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const reader = transform.readable.getReader();
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const readPromise = (async () => {
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while (true) {
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const { value, done } = await reader.read();
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if (done) break;
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chunks.push(new TextDecoder().decode(value));
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}
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})();
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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// Simulate API key being sent in two chunks
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// Prefix "sk_" + 20 chars matches the regex. Total = 23 chars.
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const chunk1 = "My key is sk_12345678901234567890"; // ends precisely on the partial key
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const payload1 = JSON.stringify({ choices: [{ delta: { content: chunk1 } }] });
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: ${payload1}\n`));
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// Because it touches the end of the streaming buffer, it should NOT be redacted yet!
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// Wait for the rest
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const chunk2 = "12345";
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const payload2 = JSON.stringify({ choices: [{ delta: { content: chunk2 } }] });
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: ${payload2}\n`));
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await writer.write(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n"));
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await writer.close();
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await readPromise;
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const fullOutput = chunks.join("");
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// The regex /(?:sk|pk|api|key|token)[_-][a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/gi matches sk_ with underscore.
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// The sanitizer MUST redact this key — if it passes through, that is a security regression.
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes("[API_KEY_REDACTED]"), "sk_ API key must be redacted");
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// The raw key digits must NOT appear in the output
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assert.ok(!fullOutput.includes("12345678901234567890"), "raw API key digits must not leak in output");
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});
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await t.test("malformed JSON fails safely without crash loop", async () => {
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const transform = createPiiSseTransform({ windowSize: 10 });
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const writer = transform.writable.getWriter();
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const chunks: string[] = [];
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const reader = transform.readable.getReader();
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const readPromise = (async () => {
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while (true) {
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const { value, done } = await reader.read();
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if (done) break;
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chunks.push(new TextDecoder().decode(value));
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}
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})();
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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// Valid JSON
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: {"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"Hello"}}]}\n`));
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// Malformed JSON (should be dropped, not treated as raw text)
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: {"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"BAD_SYNTAX\n`));
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await writer.write(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n"));
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await writer.close();
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await readPromise;
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const fullOutput = chunks.join("");
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes("Hello"));
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assert.ok(!fullOutput.includes("BAD_SYNTAX")); // Raw JSON syntax from the malformed chunk shouldn't leak
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});
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await t.test("VULN-001: control chunk type metadata is not corrupted", async () => {
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const transform = createPiiSseTransform();
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const writer = transform.writable.getWriter();
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const chunks: string[] = [];
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const reader = transform.readable.getReader();
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const readPromise = (async () => {
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while (true) {
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const { value, done } = await reader.read();
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if (done) break;
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chunks.push(new TextDecoder().decode(value));
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}
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})();
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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// Feed content that gets buffered
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: {"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"some buffer text"}}]}\n`));
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// Send a message_stop control chunk (will trigger generic fallback)
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: {"type":"message_stop"}\n`));
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await writer.write(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n"));
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await writer.close();
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await readPromise;
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const fullOutput = chunks.join("");
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// Ensure the message_stop chunk was not corrupted to "message_stop some buffer text"
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes('"type":"message_stop"'));
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});
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await t.test("VULN-002: small windowSize is clamped to 200 in production (without bypass env)", async () => {
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// Unset test bypass env variable temporarily
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const originalBypass = process.env.PII_TEST_BYPASS_MIN_WINDOW;
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delete process.env.PII_TEST_BYPASS_MIN_WINDOW;
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try {
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const transform = createPiiSseTransform({ windowSize: 10 });
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// W should be 200.
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// If we stream "hello world", length is 11, since W is 200, emitLength should be 0.
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// So nothing should be emitted before stop signal or close.
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const writer = transform.writable.getWriter();
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const reader = transform.readable.getReader();
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const chunks: string[] = [];
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const readPromise = (async () => {
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while (true) {
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const { value, done } = await reader.read();
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if (done) break;
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chunks.push(new TextDecoder().decode(value));
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}
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})();
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: {"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"hello world"}}]}\n`));
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await writer.close();
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await readPromise;
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const chunkText = chunks[0];
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// Since it's < 200 and windowSize is clamped to 200, the output chunk received before close is metadata-only or empty content
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assert.ok(chunkText.includes('"content":""') || !chunkText.includes("hello world"));
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} finally {
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process.env.PII_TEST_BYPASS_MIN_WINDOW = originalBypass;
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}
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});
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await t.test("VULN-003: ZWJ emojis and Brahmic script ligatures do not decompose", async () => {
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const familyEmoji = "👨👩👧👦"; // Uses ZWJs
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const sinhalaText = "ශ්රී"; // Sri Lanka in Sinhala, uses ZWJ/ZWNJ ligatures
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const result1 = sanitizePII(familyEmoji);
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assert.strictEqual(result1.text, familyEmoji, "Family emoji ZWJ should not be stripped");
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const result2 = sanitizePII(sinhalaText);
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assert.strictEqual(result2.text, sinhalaText, "Sinhala ligatures should not be stripped");
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});
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await t.test("VULN-004: circular references in deep sanitization do not fail open", async () => {
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const obj: any = { content: "My ssn is 123-45-6789" };
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obj.selfRef = obj; // Create circular reference
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const sanitized = sanitizePIIResponse(obj);
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// The circular reference MUST be replaced with the exact sentinel string.
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assert.strictEqual(sanitized.selfRef, "[CIRCULAR_REFERENCE_REDACTED]", "circular selfRef must use exact uppercase sentinel");
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// The SSN in the content field MUST be redacted — raw SSN passthrough is a security failure.
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assert.ok(
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typeof sanitized.content === "string" && sanitized.content.includes("[SSN_REDACTED]"),
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"SSN must be redacted to [SSN_REDACTED]"
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);
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assert.ok(
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typeof sanitized.content === "string" && !sanitized.content.includes("123-45-6789"),
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"raw SSN must not appear in sanitized output"
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);
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});
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await t.test("VULN-001 (Finding 1): top-level metadata like system_fingerprint is not corrupted/injected", async () => {
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const transform = createPiiSseTransform();
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const writer = transform.writable.getWriter();
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const chunks: string[] = [];
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const reader = transform.readable.getReader();
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const readPromise = (async () => {
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while (true) {
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const { value, done } = await reader.read();
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if (done) break;
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chunks.push(new TextDecoder().decode(value));
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}
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})();
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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// Send a standard OpenAI chunk containing content delta and system_fingerprint
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: {"choices":[{"delta":{"content":"Hello"}}],"system_fingerprint":"fp_123"}\n`));
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await writer.write(encoder.encode("data: [DONE]\n"));
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await writer.close();
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await readPromise;
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const fullOutput = chunks.join("");
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// Ensure system_fingerprint value is preserved and not cleared/corrupted
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes('"system_fingerprint":"fp_123"'));
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// Ensure it was not appended/injected into delta content
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assert.ok(!fullOutput.includes('"content":"Hello fp_123"'));
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});
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await t.test("Finding 2: Claude stream stop signals do not truncate buffered tail content", async () => {
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// In Claude format, the stream ends with content_block_stop/message_stop which doesn't contain delta.
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// The transform should synthesize a content_block_delta first containing the buffered text, then pass stop chunks.
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const transform = createPiiSseTransform();
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const writer = transform.writable.getWriter();
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const chunks: string[] = [];
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const reader = transform.readable.getReader();
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const readPromise = (async () => {
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while (true) {
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const { value, done } = await reader.read();
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if (done) break;
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chunks.push(new TextDecoder().decode(value));
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}
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})();
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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// Send content_block_delta (text gets buffered under W=200)
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: {"type":"content_block_delta","index":0,"delta":{"type":"text_delta","text":"The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog."}}\n`));
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// Send stop events
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: {"type":"content_block_stop","index":0}\n`));
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await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: {"type":"message_stop"}\n`));
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await writer.close();
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await readPromise;
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const fullOutput = chunks.join("");
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// Ensure the buffered tail is flushed in a synthesized content_block_delta
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes('"type":"content_block_delta"'));
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes("The quick brown fox"));
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// Ensure final metadata chunks are also passed through uncorrupted
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes('"type":"content_block_stop"'));
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assert.ok(fullOutput.includes('"type":"message_stop"'));
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});
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});
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