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39 lines
2.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
39 lines
2.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/sh
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# Entrypoint for the docsgpt-sandbox Jupyter Kernel Gateway.
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#
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# The gateway and every session kernel share this one container, so LLM-authored
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# kernel code can reach the gateway's control API over loopback
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# (http://localhost:8888). WITHOUT authentication that means kernel code could
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# enumerate/attach/kill sibling sessions' kernels and spawn kernels without bound
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# (bypassing the app-side session cap). We therefore REQUIRE an auth token and
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# fail closed if it is missing -- an unauthenticated gateway must never start.
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#
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# The token is shared with the app via SANDBOX_GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN (the app sends
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# it as `Authorization: token <...>`). kernel-launch.sh re-execs ipykernel under a
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# scrubbed `env -i` allowlist that excludes the token, so it is NOT in kernel code's
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# os.environ. NOTE: this is not a hard secret boundary -- the gateway and kernels
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# share one container and uid, so kernel code can still read the gateway's env via
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# /proc/<gateway_pid>/environ. The token limits the blast radius (an outside caller
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# cannot drive the gateway), but the Jupyter runner is a single trust domain: for
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# real isolation against untrusted code use the Daytona backend or run under gVisor
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# (see deployment/sandbox/README.md).
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set -eu
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TOKEN="${SANDBOX_GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN:-}"
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if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
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echo "docsgpt-sandbox: refusing to start an unauthenticated gateway." >&2
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echo "Set SANDBOX_GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN (same value on the app and this container)." >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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# ip=0.0.0.0 so the backend/worker can reach it over the internal sandbox network.
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# auth_token gates every HTTP + WebSocket request, including loopback ones from
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# kernel code. limit_rate=False raises the iopub data-rate cap so large get_file
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# base64 payloads are not truncated (the get_file integrity check still guards
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# truncation if this is ever off).
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exec jupyter kernelgateway \
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--KernelGatewayApp.ip=0.0.0.0 \
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--KernelGatewayApp.port=8888 \
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--KernelGatewayApp.auth_token="$TOKEN" \
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--ZMQChannelsWebsocketConnection.limit_rate=False
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