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101 lines
4.6 KiB
Swift
101 lines
4.6 KiB
Swift
//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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// Copyright © 2026 Apple Inc. and the Containerization project authors.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
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#if os(Linux)
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import Foundation
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/// Per-component opt-ins to weaken the upstream-secure spawn flags for
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/// cloud-hypervisor and virtiofsd. Each flag is independent so an operator
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/// can target the minimum hardening that needs to come off — e.g. running
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/// inside apple/container's `--virtualization` dev container needs both,
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/// but a future bare-metal Linux host with a custom seccomp policy might
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/// only need one.
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///
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/// Read once per process at first reference. Default false (secure).
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///
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/// **Legacy alias.** `CONTAINERIZATION_RELAXED_SANDBOX=1` continues to flip
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/// every flag here for back-compat with the original combined toggle. New
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/// callers should prefer the per-component vars below.
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enum SandboxOverrides {
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/// When set, cloud-hypervisor is launched with `--seccomp false`.
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/// Disables CH's userspace seccomp BPF filter; the kernel's filter
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/// (whatever the host policy is) still applies.
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///
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/// Env: `CONTAINERIZATION_NO_CH_SECCOMP=1`
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static let chSeccompDisabled: Bool =
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boolEnv("CONTAINERIZATION_NO_CH_SECCOMP") || legacyRelaxedSandbox
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/// When set, virtiofsd is launched with `--sandbox none`. Disables
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/// virtiofsd's userns + pivot_root + seccomp setup. Combined with the
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/// vendored cap-drop patch (`scripts/patches/virtiofsd-skip-cap-drop-with-sandbox-none.patch`)
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/// at build time, the daemon retains its parent's capabilities — so
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/// only enable this when the parent process is the trust boundary you
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/// want.
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///
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/// Env: `CONTAINERIZATION_NO_VIRTIOFSD_SANDBOX=1`
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static let virtiofsdSandboxDisabled: Bool =
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boolEnv("CONTAINERIZATION_NO_VIRTIOFSD_SANDBOX") || legacyRelaxedSandbox
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/// True if any override is currently in effect — used by callers that
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/// want to log a single banner regardless of which flag is set.
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static var anyEnabled: Bool {
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chSeccompDisabled || virtiofsdSandboxDisabled
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}
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/// Back-compat alias: enables every per-component flag in one shot.
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private static let legacyRelaxedSandbox: Bool =
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boolEnv("CONTAINERIZATION_RELAXED_SANDBOX")
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private static func boolEnv(_ name: String) -> Bool {
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ProcessInfo.processInfo.environment[name] == "1"
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}
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}
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/// Minimal environment allowlist for child processes we spawn (`CHProcess`,
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/// `VirtiofsdProcess`). Inheriting the parent's full env exposes any
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/// secrets the calling tool happens to have set (`AWS_*`, `KUBE_*`,
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/// `*_TOKEN`, etc.) to a binary that has no use for them. Only the
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/// variables below are forwarded — extend this list when a new spawn-time
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/// dependency surfaces, and document why.
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///
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/// - `PATH`, `HOME`: minimum POSIX hygiene; some libc/setuid paths look at
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/// these even for self-contained binaries.
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/// - `RUST_LOG`, `RUST_BACKTRACE`: cloud-hypervisor and virtiofsd are Rust
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/// binaries; pass these through if the operator has set them so
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/// debugging is unimpaired.
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enum ChildEnvironment {
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/// Construct a minimal environment for the child as `KEY=value` strings
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/// suitable for `Command.environment`. Variables not present in the
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/// parent env are simply omitted.
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static func minimal() -> [String] {
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let allowlist = ["PATH", "HOME", "RUST_LOG", "RUST_BACKTRACE"]
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let parent = ProcessInfo.processInfo.environment
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var entries: [String] = []
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// PATH falls back to a sane default since Command's execve needs an
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// absolute path anyway, but child Rust binaries occasionally probe
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// PATH for helper tools.
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let path = parent["PATH"] ?? "/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
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entries.append("PATH=\(path)")
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for key in allowlist where key != "PATH" {
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if let value = parent[key] {
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entries.append("\(key)=\(value)")
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}
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}
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return entries
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}
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}
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#endif
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