chore: import upstream snapshot with attribution

2026-07-13 11:55:55 +08:00
commit d48cda4081
3322 changed files with 668744 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * Host/Origin gating for ECC's loopback HTTP servers (control pane, plan
+ * canvas). DNS rebinding can point an attacker-controlled hostname at
+ * 127.0.0.1, so every request must present a Host header from this
+ * allowlist before the server does any work.
+ */
+
+const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['127.0.0.1', 'localhost', '[::1]', '::1']);
+
+// Extract the hostname portion of an HTTP Host header value, stripping any
+// port. Returns null when the header is missing or malformed.
+function parseHostHeader(value) {
+  if (!value || typeof value !== 'string') return null;
+  const trimmed = value.trim();
+  if (!trimmed) return null;
+  const match = trimmed.match(/^(\[[^\]]+\]|[^:]+)(?::\d+)?$/);
+  if (!match) return null;
+  return match[1].toLowerCase();
+}
+
+function buildAllowedHostnames(configuredHost) {
+  const set = new Set(LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES);
+  if (configuredHost) set.add(String(configuredHost).toLowerCase());
+  return set;
+}
+
+function isAllowedHostHeader(hostHeader, allowedHostnames) {
+  const hostname = parseHostHeader(hostHeader);
+  if (!hostname) return false;
+  return allowedHostnames.has(hostname);
+}
+
+// Origin is absent on same-origin navigations and CLI clients; when present
+// it must resolve to an allowed hostname.
+function isAllowedOrigin(originHeader, allowedHostnames) {
+  if (!originHeader || typeof originHeader !== 'string') return true;
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(originHeader);
+    return allowedHostnames.has(url.hostname.toLowerCase());
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES,
+  buildAllowedHostnames,
+  isAllowedHostHeader,
+  isAllowedOrigin,
+  parseHostHeader
+};