kage launched Chrome with --no-sandbox unconditionally, which turns off the
browser's main security boundary for every run, including ordinary desktop
use where the sandbox works fine. Since kage renders pages from the open web,
a renderer exploit could then reach the host. Reported in #10.
Keep the sandbox on by default and drop it only where it genuinely cannot
initialize: inside a container, or when running as root (Chrome refuses to
start a sandbox as root). Containers are detected from IN_DOCKER or the
/.dockerenv marker, and there kage also sets --disable-dev-shm-usage because
the default 64 MB /dev/shm is too small for the renderer on large pages.
Whenever the sandbox is dropped kage says so on stderr, so it is never silent.
Thanks to Dimitrios Prasakis for the report and to the commenter on Hacker
News who suggested the IN_DOCKER opt-in.
Duc-Tam Nguyen
dab6c11ea8